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Abstract
Two studies investigated boundary conditions of an effect of social presence on the
Stroop task and its interpretation in terms of an attentional view (P. Huguet, M. P.
Galvaing, J. M. Monteil, & F. Dumas, 1999). In this view, social presence leads to
attentional focusing, enhancing participants’ ability to screen out the distracting
features of Stroop stimuli. As predicted, Stroop interference was found to be
reduced by social presence, but an alternative account in which social presence
exerts an effect on task selection received more support.
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The phenomenon of social facilitation is one of the oldest studied in social
psychology (Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Guerin, 1993). It refers to the finding that
performance in simple tasks is often improved in the presence of others (audience
condition) relative to a condition in which people work alone (alone condition).
The present paper examines the effects of social presence on the Stroop
task. In the Stroop task, participants identify the color of colored targets as fast
and accurately as possible. In incongruent trials, target words denote a color (e.g.,
red), or are related to a color (e.g., blood), that differs from the one in which the
word is shown (e.g., in blue). In neutral trials, the target is a color-neutral word
(e.g., table) or a control string (e.g., ++++) that is not a word. Stroop interference
is the difference in mean response latencies between incongruent and neutral trials.
Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, and Dumas (1999, Exp. 1) found much larger
Stroop interference in the alone condition than in a condition with a passive,
non-evaluative audience, that they termed invisible audience. This is an important
finding because it allowed Huguet et al. to discriminate between two major theories
of social facilitation, the dominant-response account by Zajonc (1965) and an
attentional view (Baron, 1986; see also Cohen, 1978).
According to Zajonc (1965), simple tasks are simple because the dominant
response associated with task stimuli is the correct one. In this view, the effect of
an audience is to increase arousal which in turn facilitates the dominant response.
The result is improved performance in simple tasks.
According to the attentional view, the presence of others is frequently
distracting and threatens participants with cognitive overload. This leads to a
restriction in attentional focus. In this view, simple tasks are simple because
performing at a high level requires attending to only a few central cues. Narrowing
the attentional focus is helpful in focusing on these few cues and in screening out
irrelevant cues. The result is improved performance in simple tasks.
In many situations, both accounts lead to parallel predictions, but the
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ingenious observation by Huguet et al. (1999) was that both differ with respect to
what is expected for the Stroop task. When the target is a word, the dominant
response is to read it, identifying word meaning, whereas identifying the word color
is a less dominant response. Because word meaning is the major cause of
interference in the Stroop task, strengthening the dominant response should
increase interference. Social presence should thus lead to larger Stroop interference
according to the dominant-response account. In contrast, according to the
attentional view, attentional focusing is helpful in selecting the relevant stimulus
feature (i.e., word color) and in filtering out the irrelevant stimulus feature (i.e.,
word meaning). Smaller Stroop interference is thereby predicted in distracting
audience conditions.
Huguet et al.’s (1999) Experiment 1 supported the prediction derived from
the attentional view. In addition, recognition memory for the words used in the
incongruent trials was better in the alone condition than in the audience condition.
This is to be expected if word meaning was filtered out in the audience condition.
To summarize, according to Huguet et al. (1999), social presence caused a
reduction of the Stroop effect in the audience condition below the level observed in
standard conditions because social presence narrowed attentional focus, thereby
enhancing attentional selectivity.
Three issues potentially challenge this explanation: 1) The nature of
attentional selection, 2) prior studies on the effects of social presence and
distraction on the Stroop task, and 3) the size of the Stroop effects reported by
Huguet et al. (1999).
First, attentional focusing operates at several levels, in task selection,
object selection, and dimensional selection. For example, Baron (1986) argues that
narrowing of attentional focus leads to focusing on a task seen as primary in
dual-task situations in which two tasks have to be performed simultaneously (task
selection). Within a given task, it leads to focusing on the relevant stimulus and
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screening out of irrelevant stimuli (object selection). Within the relevant object,
finally, attentional focusing increases the utilization of relevant features and the
screening-out of irrelevant and distracting features (dimensional selection). With
regard to object selection and dimensional selection, there is an ongoing debate on
whether both are negatively related (e.g., Chen, 2003; see also Kahneman & Henik,
1981; Wu¨hr & Waszak, 1981) or independent (e.g., Shalev & Algom, 2000; see also
Besner, 2001; Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997; Chajut & Algom, 2003). According
to one point of view, object selection leads to decreased dimensional selection.
Thus, to the extent to which an object is attended to, all of its features, relevant
and irrelevant features alike, receive increased processing, leading to decreased
dimensional selection. For example, Chen (2003) experimentally manipulated
attentional focus in the Stroop task using cueing manipulations adopted from the
attention literature. In his studies, narrowing attentional focus enhanced rather
than decreased Stroop interference (from 24 ms to 45 ms in Experiment 1, and
from 64 ms to 88 ms in Experiment 4). This suggests that social presence, via a
narrowing of attentional focus, might increase rather than decrease Stroop
interference.
Second, prior studies on the effects of social presence on Stroop effects as
discussed by Huguet et al. (1999) yielded conflicting results. Note, however, that
the studies by Huguet et al. (1999) were methodologically stronger in several
aspects than most prior studies. Similarly, there are a number of studies of the
effect of distraction by noise on the Stroop task with mixed results (Chajut &
Algom, 2003; Glass & Singer, 1972). The mixed results of prior studies do not
question the findings by Huguet et al. (1999) in any way, but they raise the
desirability of replications of the effect.
Third, the Stroop effects in Huguet et al.’s Experiment 1 were 170 ms and
101 ms in the alone and (invisible) audience conditions, respectively. The 170 ms
effect in the alone condition struck us as unusually large. Stroop effects are largest
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when the incongruent words denote colors that can occur as responses, they
decrease for color words not in the response set, and further decrease for
color-related words (McLeod, 1991). Furthermore, Stroop effects are decreased
when responses are delivered via keypresses rather than vocally (McLeod, 1991).
Huguet et al. (1999) employed keypresses and mostly color-related words or color
words not in the response set (see appendix). As a consequence, Stroop effects
much below 170 ms might have been expected.
For example, Sharma and McKenna (1998) reported a Stroop effect of 148
ms with manual responses for color words in the response set, but Stroop
interference dropped to 51 ms for color words not in the response set and to 35 ms
for color-related words (see also Risko, Schmidt, & Besner, 2006). In follow-up
studies concerned with social coaction and comparison, Huguet and colleagues
(Dumas, Huguet, Monteil, & Ayme, 2005; Huguet, Dumas, & Monteil, 2004;
Huguet et al., 1999, Exp. 2) used very similar materials and procedures as Huguet
et al. (1999) in their Experiment 1. Across the many Stroop tasks administered in
these experiments, the largest interference score that occurred was 94 ms.1 There
were small differences between Huguet et al.’s (1999) Experiment 1 and these
subsequent experiments even in the alone conditions that may be responsible for
the different results. One such difference suggested to us that the 170 ms effect in
the alone condition in Huguet et al.’s (1999) Experiment 1 might have been
inflated beyond normal levels.
Specifically, we hypothesized that a dual-task instruction in combination
with the particular stimuli used as targets might have caused the unusually large
Stroop effect. Participants were instructed that technical, computer-related
problems had just emerged on the task they had been invited to perform and that
another task would be performed instead. Second, they were informed that the
computer on which this new task is run was not yet programmed to record their
responses. Finally, they were told that the goal of this session was to give their
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general impression about this new task. They went on to the instructions for the
Stroop task proper which emphasized as usual speed and accuracy.
The purpose of the impression-formation instruction was to reduce possible
evaluation apprehension, a factor that has been argued to cause, or at least
enhance, social presence effects (Cottrell, 1972; Geen, 1989). At the same time, the
instruction introduces, however, a second task, that we will refer to as the
impression task, in addition to the Stroop task itself. This second task is to form
an impression of the Stroop task. It is a derived or secondary task in the sense that
it cannot be performed without performing the Stroop task.
There is some conflict between the Stroop task and the impression task:
Responding as fast and as accurately as possible in the Stroop task conflicts with
spending time and other processing resources on forming an impression of the
Stroop task. We believe that participants in alone conditions have sufficient
capacity to engage in both tasks simultaneously and that they resolve the conflict
by spending proportionally more time inspecting and thinking about the
color-incongruent words than the neutral targets: The neutral targets
(++++−strings) are meaningless and hold little intrinsic interest. In contrast, the
targets in incongruent trials, being meaningful words, hold more intrinsic interest.
Similarly, the ++++−strings were repetitive whereas each individual word
occurred less frequently than each ++++−string. This makes each word more
distinct individually than each ++++−string (Higgins, 1996). In forming an
impression of the task, it therefore makes sense to spend proportionally more time
elaborating on the words and to skip over the repetitive and uninteresting neutral
stimuli quickly. This would inflate interference scores and recognition memory.
Why then should interference return to more normal levels in the audience
condition? We hypothesize, following Huguet et al. (1999), that social presence is
distracting and threatens participants with cognitive overload. As a consequence,
we assume that the Stroop task is prioritized (task selection) to maintain
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satisfactory performance in that task, whereas participants more or less quit
working on the secondary impression task in the audience condition. Thus,
participants effectively revert to a single-task condition. As a consequence,
interference scores are no longer inflated in the audience condition.2
A number of new predictions can be derived from this analysis. Two kinds
of conditions, implemented in two experiments, should cause interference scores to
drop from the large score observed in the alone condition to more normal levels as
elaborated next:
1. Conditions that remove the secondary impression formation task:
• (Condition 1a) via instructions (Experiment 1) or
• (Condition 1b) via social presence (as just explained and implemented in
Experiments 1 and 2).
2. Conditions that reduce the difference in distinctiveness and intrinsic interest
between the color words and the neutral control stimuli:
• (Condition 2a) via the use of words as controls (Experiment 2) or
• (Condition 2b) via performing the Stroop task a second time
(Experiments 1 and 2).
Condition 1a) was implemented via instructions: Half of the participants in
Experiment 1 worked with the additional impression task, whereas the Stroop task
was the only instructed task for the other participants. Condition 1b) was
implemented in both experiments as a condition with a passive non-evaluative
audience. According to the above, in both conditions the secondary impression task
should be removed, causing Stroop effects to return to normal levels.
In Experiment 2, all participants worked with the additional impression
task. The impression task causes inflated interference scores because of the
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difference in distinctiveness and interest value between words used in incongruent
trials and neutral stimuli. Conditions 2a) and 2b) were designed to decrease this
difference in different ways.
Condition 2a) was implemented in Experiment 2 through the use of words
as neutral control stimuli. Participants either worked with the original stimuli
translated from Huguet et al. (1999), including the boring and repetitive
++++−stimuli, or they saw color-neutral words instead of ++++−stimuli in
neutral trials. Being meaningful words, the color-neutral words hold more intrinsic
interest than the ++++−controls. Furthermore, each such word appeared less
frequently than the ++++−controls. Thus, the neutral words are less repetitive
and more interesting than the +++++−stimuli. When the neutral words are used
in neutral trials instead of ++++−stimuli, the difference in distinctiveness and
interest value between the words used in incongruent trials and the stimuli used in
neutral trials is thereby decreased.
The purpose of Condition 2b) was to decrease the distinctiveness and
interest value of the words used in incongruent trials. Condition 2b) was
implemented in both experiments by having each participant perform the Stroop
task twice. When the Stroop task is performed the second time, each word has
already been seen twice in the first set of Stroop trials and its reappearance for a
third and fourth time in the second set of trials should no longer induce
participants to spend much time inspecting and thinking about it even when they
intend to form an impression of the Stroop task.
To summarize, we should be able to replicate the unusually large
interference score found in Huguet et al.’s (1999) alone condition, that is, when the
Stroop task is performed alone and for the first time, with concurrent impression
task, and ++++−type controls, henceforth referred to as the critical condition. In
contrast, Stroop interference should revert to more normal levels in all other
conditions, that is, 1a) in audience conditions, 1b) when the Stroop task is the only
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task, 2a) when neutral stimuli are words instead of ++++−strings, or 2b) when
the Stroop task is seen the second time.
These predictions were tested by three contrasts specified for each
experiment alike: 1) Interference scores in the critical condition should be larger
than the average interference observed in all other conditions. 2) There should be
no significant differences between the interference scores in the other conditions. 3)
The interference score in the critical condition should also be larger than the
average interference score in the other alone conditions. The third contrast
underlines our analysis that Stroop interference was not reduced below normal
levels in the audience conditions, but that interference scores were inflated above
normal levels in the critical condition.
It has been argued that in one sense, it is difficult to implement a true
alone condition because we frequently carry thoughts about an audience around
with us (e.g., Markus, 1978); this implicit audience may be particularly salient in
an alone condition that is preceded by an audience condition (e.g., Huguet et al.,
1999). Relatedly, prolonged practice reduces Stroop effects (e.g., Dulaney &
Rogers, 1994). For these reasons, we also present the results of the contrast
analyses with the contrasts restricted to the conditions in which the Stroop task is
performed for the first time. The restricted contrasts cannot be affected by possible
practice effects, nor by possible effects of an implicit audience made salient by a
preceding audience condition. Note, however, that there is little empirical work
testing the idea of an implicit audience (Guerin, 1993, chap. 10), and that the
amount of practice implied by performing the Stroop task a second time may have
little effect (Huguet et al., 1999).
Method
Participants
In Experiment 1 and 2, respectively, 62 and 80 persons participated, most
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of them University-of-Freiburg students with different majors. For Experiment 2,
we accepted only students with majors other than psychology who had never before
participated in a psychological study. In both experiments, participants’ gender
was counterbalanced with the experimental manipulations. Participants received a
monetary gratification of 3.50 Euro for their participation.
Stroop Task
The details of the Stroop task closely followed those employed by Huguet
et al. (1999). The Stroop stimuli were presented in the middle of a 43 cm VGA
color monitor in one of four colors: blue, green, red, or yellow. There were five
practice blocks, comprising 24 neutral trials each, using color-neutral words.
There were two experimental blocks with 84 trials each. The first four
trials were neutral trials that were warm-up trials and not analyzed further. The
remaining trials comprised 40 incongruent trials and 40 neutral trials. For each
color, there were five color-incongruent words translated from Huguet et al.’s
materials; each such word was shown two times per experimental block. In
Experiment 1 and for half of the participants in Experiment 2, the neutral trials of
the experimental blocks presented strings of plus signs (e.g., ++++) of different
lengths. For the other half of participants in Experiment 2, the neutral trials
presented 20 color-neutral words that differed from the neutral words used in
practice blocks and that were matched to the 20 color-incongruent words in
imageability, that is, in the ease with which a mental image of the denoted object
could be formed (Mneutral = 4.62 and Mincongruent = 4.61 on a six-point rating
scale as rated by 88 University-of-Freiburg students who did not participate in the
experiments). These words and the incongruent words are shown in the appendix.
Participants were asked to identify the color in which the stimulus was
shown. They were to press the keys y, x, n, and m to respond, in order, blue, green,
red, and yellow. The Stroop stimulus was removed from the screen upon the
response. Incorrect responses were followed by an error feedback in the form of the
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word “FEHLER” (ERROR) presented for 500 ms on the screen. Participants’
instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy.
Design and Procedure
Participants worked through the practice blocks, followed by two
experimental blocks of the Stroop task; for one of the experimental blocks, they
worked in the presence of another person (audience condition); for the other one,
they worked alone (alone condition). Order of alone and audience condition was
orthogonally crossed with an instruction manipulation in Experiment 1, and a
manipulation of the neutral stimuli in Experiment 2.
In Experiment 1, half of the participants were exposed to the
“impression-formation” instruction (impression condition) already described in the
introduction upon entering the laboratory. The other half received only the normal
instructions about the upcoming Stroop task (only-Stroop condition).
In Experiment 2, all participants worked under the “impression-formation”
instruction, but the kind of stimuli used in neutral trials was manipulated. Half of
the participants saw neutral words in neutral trials, the other half saw strings of
plus signs (++++-controls).
The audience in audience conditions was a confederate of the experimenter.
The confederate was introduced as another participant waiting for another
experiment. He or she was present for the duration of one experimental block of
the Stroop task. The confederate was seated about 1.60 m behind the participant’s
back so that the participant blocked this person’s view of the screen.3 The
confederate was thus clearly unable to evaluate the participant’s performance.
Participant, experimenter, and confederate were either all male or all female.
Participants were completely alone in alone conditions.
After completion of two experimental blocks of the Stroop task,
participants filled in a self-consciousness scale (Merz, 1986), were probed for
suspicion, and debriefed.
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In summary, each person worked in an alone and an audience condition. In
each experiment, there were four groups, defined by the order in which alone and
audience condition were administered, and an additional manipulation of the
instruction in Experiment 1 and of the neutral stimuli in Experiment 2.
Results
Error rates were 4.54% and 3.42% in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.
The analyses are based on correct response latencies. Short latencies below 300 ms
were excluded as well as long latencies that were above the individual’s median
latency by more than three interquartile ranges (Rothermund, 2003). This led to
the exclusion of 1.89% and 2.46% of the response latencies in Experiments 1 and 2,
respectively.
Contrast Analyses
In both experiments, there were four groups, and each participant
performed alone and in an audience condition, yielding eight conditions. Mean
Stroop effects observed in these conditions are shown in Figure 1, mean latencies
for incongruent and neutral stimuli in Table 1. It can be seen that the critical
condition (leftmost condition in each panel of Figure 1) was associated with by far
the largest interference score in both experiments; in Experiments 1 and 2,
respectively, 167 ms and 141 ms.
Contrast analyses were conducted using the method described by Winer,
Brown, and Michels (1991; chap. 7) for mixed designs. According to the first
contrast, the Stroop effect in the critical condition was significantly larger than the
average Stroop effect, 70 ms and 60 ms, across the seven other conditions,
F (1, 116) = 8.92, p < .01, and F (1, 152) = 9.55, p < .01, in Experiments 1 and 2,
respectively. At the same time, according to the second planned comparison, there
were no significant differences between the remaining seven conditions in either
experiment, both F s< 1. Interference in the critical condition was finally
significantly larger than average interference in the other alone conditions, 70 ms
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and 52 ms, according to the third contrast: F (1, 116) = 7.80, p < .01, and
F (1, 152) = 9.96, p < .01, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.
The same pattern of results emerged when the contrasts were formulated
only for the first experimental block of Stroop trials, that is, for the “first”
conditions in Table 1 and Figure 1. The Stroop effect was significantly larger in the
critical condition than the average Stroop effect, 89 ms and 70 ms, across the other
three “first” conditions, F (1, 116) = 4.98, p = .03, and F (1, 152) = 6.41, p < .01, in
Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. At the same time, there were no significant
differences between these three conditions in either experiment, both F s< 1.
Interference in the critical condition was finally significantly larger than interference
in the other alone-first condition, 94 ms and 59 ms, according to the third contrast:
F (1, 116) = 3.00, one-tailed p = .04, and F (1, 152) = 5.61, p = .02, in Experiments
1 and 2, respectively. Note that the use of a one-tailed test (for the third contrast
in Experiment 1) is legitimate given that we formulated directed hypotheses.
Additional Analyses
In both experiments, there were the critical alone condition and a parallel
audience condition with additional impression task, ++++−type controls, and
Stroop task performed for the first time. These two conditions replicate the alone
and (invisible) audience condition of Huguet et al.’s (1999) Experiment 1. To
contrast these two conditions, it is legitimate to pool the data across both our
experiments. The Stroop interference score was significantly larger in the critical
condition, M = 152 ms, SD = 145 ms, than in the parallel audience condition,
M = 86 ms, SD = 120 ms, t(69) = 2.12, p = .04, so that Huguet et al.’s (1999)
basic effect can be replicated.
Without the critical condition, the average Stroop effects in the remaining
alone conditions and in the audience conditions were 70 ms and 71 ms, respectively,
in Experiment 1 and 52 ms and 67 ms, respectively, in Experiment 2. There was
thus little evidence for a reduction in Stroop effects in audience conditions relative
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to alone conditions when the critical condition was left out of the analyses.4
An anonymous reviewer argued that due to the implicit-audience problem
(see introduction) only the alone-first conditions and the audience-second
conditions should be considered. As pointed out by the reviewer, Stroop
interference decreases from 94 ms in the alone-first condition to 47 ms in the
audience-second condition of Experiment 1 when the impression task is removed
(only-Stroop conditions); a decrease that approaches significance in a one-tailed
test: t(15) = 1.63, p = .06. This observation suggests a comparatively small effect
of social presence on dimensional selection in the Stroop task itself. In contrast, in
Experiment 2, there is no effect of social presence on Stroop interference when
neutral words are used: Stroop interference was 59 ms in the alone-first condition
and 53 ms in the audience-second condition, t < 1. We return to these findings in
the discussion.5
An analysis of variance was computed to see whether the effects of social
presence on the Stroop effect varied across the four groups in each experiment. An
interaction of social presence (alone versus audience; within participants) and the
group factor is implied by the first contrast, but the interaction test is less focused
than the analysis by means of planned comparisons. Nevertheless, in both
experiments, the interaction reached significance, F (3, 58) = 5.71, p < .01, and
F (3, 76) = 3.94, p = .01, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.
With vocal responses, but not with manual responses, there is a small
“lexical” effect meaning that responses to neutral words are slower than responses
to nonword control strings (Sharma & McKenna, 1998). It is possible that the
lexical effect contributed to the pattern of findings in Experiment 2. Excluding the
group with critical condition, we therefore tested whether Stroop effects were
smaller for the conditions with words in neutral trials than with ++++-type
controls. An analysis of variance with factors social presence, sequence, and neutral
stimuli (++++−type controls vs. neutral words) did not reveal significant effects
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or interactions involving the stimuli used in neutral trials, largest F (1, 57) = 1.36,
smallest p = .25.
Discussion
The present studies replicated a reduction in interference scores as a
function of social presence, but they cast the effect in a different light. According
to the present analysis, it arises due to a particular combination of circumstances
including the requirement to form an impression of the Stroop task, a difference in
intrinsic interest and distinctiveness between the stimuli used in incongruent trials
and in neutral trials, and the absence of distraction in alone conditions.
Interference scores are unusually large in the critical condition that combines these
circumstances, but Stroop effects return to more normal levels when any of these
ingredients are absent. These results suggest that the reduction in interference
scores in the audience conditions does not arise because attentional focusing made
it easier to screen out the distracting word meaning. Rather, interference scores
were inflated in the critical alone condition because the attempt to form an
impression of the Stroop task pushed participants to spend proportionally more
time inspecting and thinking about the words used in incongruent trials.
What do these results imply for the effects of social presence? The present
analysis postulates an effect of social presence on task selection. Participants
prioritized the Stroop task and neglected the impression task when distracted by
social presence. We argued that this occurred as a consequence of attentional
focusing operating at the level of task selection.
The present studies are subject to a number of limitations and criticisms.
A difference between the present procedures and those employed by Huguet et al.
(1999) is that we provided error feedback in the rare event of a wrong response in
the Stroop task, whereas Huguet et al. did not. The error feedback may have
induced some amount of evaluation apprehension which by itself might reduce
Stroop effects (Chajut & Algom, 2003). Yet, we replicated Huguet et al.’s main
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finding and our Stroop effects were generally in the same order of magnitude as
those reported by Huguet et al., suggesting that the error feedback did not induce
crippling amounts of evaluation apprehension. Note also that Bond and Titus
(1983) concluded in their meta-analysis of social-facilitation studies that “social
facilitation effects are surprisingly unrelated to the performer’s evaluation
apprehension” (p. 265).
Similarly, Huguet et al. (1999) employed the impression-formation
instruction to minimize possible evaluation apprehension. As a consequence,
Stroop effects under normal instructions in which the Stroop task is the only
instructed task (Experiment 1) might already be reduced due to increased
evaluation apprehension. They would therefore not constitute an appropriate
baseline against which to consider the Stroop effect in the critical alone condition
inflated. Yet, the same pattern of effects as in Experiment 1 emerged in
Experiment 2, in which all participants worked under the impression-formation
instruction and evaluation apprehension should therefore have been uniformly low.
The conclusions of the present paper are in part negative: The clearest
evidence to date for an effect of a passive, non-evaluative social presence on
dimensional selection within the Stroop task is questioned. There were, however,
hints of a small additional effect of social presence on dimensional selection in the
Stroop task when a selected subset of conditions was analyzed in Experiment 1.
In a more general and positive vein, the modulation of the Stroop effect by
factors such as instructions, the nature of control stimuli, and task repetition that
is evident in our data underlines Huguet et al.’s analysis (1999) that the Stroop
effect does not reflect invariant automatic processing. In particular, Huguet et al.
(1999) argued that social presence is so powerful that it alters word reading; a
hypothesis that is consistent with the findings from Experiment 2 in which the
effects of social presence were eliminated when control stimuli were neutral words
instead of nonwords.
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The major contention tested by the present studies is that social presence
exerts an effect on task selection in dual-task situations. Participants in audience
conditions may withdraw attention from tasks seen as secondary or derived; an
intriguing possibility that deserves further study.
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Appendix
Incongruent and Neutral Words
Word Color
Blue Green Red Yellow
— Incongruent —
Gru¨n [green] Rot [red] Gelb [yellow] Blau [blue]
Kirsche [cherry] Himmel [sky] Ozean [ocean] Blut [blood]
Sonne [sun] Golda [gold] Tanne [fir] Rasen [lawn]
Schwarz [black] Orange [orange] Grau [grey] Weiß [white]
Teer [tar] Watte [cotton] Kaffee [coffee] Maus [mouse]
— Neutral (Experiment 2) —
Pfeil [arrow] Brett [board] Bild [picture] Schiff [ship]
Kreis [circle] Mutter [mother] Markt [market] Brief [letter]
Altar [altar] Rathaus [town hall] Geld [money] Maler [painter]
Ofen [oven] Stuhl [seat] Kirche [church] Wiege [cradle]
Fahne [flag] Auto [car] Quadrat [square] Kugel [sphere]
aReplaces “canary” from Huguet et al. (1999).
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Footnotes
1Larger interference scores (162 ms and 142 ms) were reported in Huguet et al.
(2004) for an analysis restricted to color words, excluding color-related words.
2 Participants do not have the alternative to prioritize the impression task and quit
working on the Stroop task, because the impression task cannot be performed
without performing the Stroop task in the first place.
3Huguet et al. (1999) also implemented two audience conditions in which the
audience faced the participant so that both could see each other.
4Note that Stroop interference in the audience-first condition in Experiment 1 is
larger when the impression task is removed (M = 105 ms) than when the
impression task is present (M = 69), which might be seen as running against our
interpretation. But the difference is not significant, t < 1.
5 As explained in the introduction, the implicit-audience problem may question
data from alone conditions that follow an audience condition (i.e., data from
alone-second conditions). But it is difficult to see how the audience-first conditions
could thereby be compromised. When the audience-first conditions are also
included, any effect of social presence on performing the Stroop task without
concurrent impression task is eliminated.
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Table 1
Mean Response Latencies (ms)
Neutral Incongruent
Condition M SD M SD
— Experiment 1 —
Alone first
Impression 934 211 1102 342
Only Stroop 787 176 881 223
Alone second
Impression 759 111 812 140
Only Stroop 782 168 845 249
Audience first
Impression 794 111 863 161
Only Stroop 833 182 938 312
Audience second
Impression 858 162 920 205
Only Stroop 724 158 771 226
— Experiment 2 —
Alone first
++++−controls 831 214 972 338
Neutral words 868 181 927 185
Alone second
++++−controls 856 223 910 269
Neutral words 763 152 806 187
Audience first
++++−controls 909 237 1008 332
Neutral words 835 196 885 238
Audience second
++++−controls 807 215 871 314
Neutral words 735 173 788 238
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Mean Stroop effects in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, all
participants worked with ++++−type controls; in Experiment 2, all participants
worked with additional impression task. The critical condition is the leftmost
condition in both panels.
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